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1. Motivation for using earn-outs
A number of circumstances have to be tackled and decided upon by the par-
ticipating parties in the course of a company transaction. The main problem for the 
concerned parties (valuation subjects) is obviously the valuation of the company in 
question (the valuation object). Apart from a variety of possible valuation methods 
at their disposal, the aspired goals of the transaction, the subjective decision fields, 
and the expectations of the future performance of the company measured by its 
related future payments all play a decisive role in its valuation (Hering et al., 2016).
The computed marginal price as a maximal (minimal) willingness to pay 
(demand for payment) of the buyer (seller) is a crucial figure to evaluate the 
advantageousness of a company transaction (Hering and Toll, 2015; Hering et 
al., 2015b). If the marginal price of the seller is below the marginal price of the 
buyer, the area of agreement is positive, and there is a chance to reach a ne-
gotiation settlement. If, however, the minimum demandable price of the seller is 
higher than the maximum payable price of the buyer, there is no potential area 
of agreement in the initial round of negotiations. In this case, it is not as simple 
for the negotiating parties to yield an acceptable outcome for both sides of the 
negotiation. Around 90% of all initiated transaction processes are never closed 
and never result in a purchase contract (Borowicz et al., 2009, p. 77) since the 
conflicting points cannot be resolved (especially the question about an acceptable 
level of purchase price). The purchase price is particularly crucial, since it mirrors 
not only the expectations of any future payment surpluses of the company but 
also the number of additional conflicts that are channeled into it.
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As far as company transactions are concerned, it is certainly clear that the 
information levels of the concerned parties are different, which can be a main 
cause for divergent price expectations. The seller has an information advantage 
and is able to judge the future performance of the company more accurately 
than the buyer (Caselli et al., 2006, p. 97). The kind of information asymmetry 
depends on a number of company- and buyer-related factors (Kohers and Ang, 
2000; Datar et al., 2001; Reuer et al., 2004). For instance, a listed company is 
subjected to certain corporate publicity regulations, which offers high transpar-
ency. The level of information asymmetry can also be inferred from the nature 
(tangible/intangible) and extent of the existing assets of the company. Compa-
nies that hold mainly intangible assets are more difficult to evaluate than those 
ones that possess assets for which market prices exist (Coff, 1999). The higher 
the efforts in research and development within a company or within a related 
branch, the more difficult it is to judge the future potential for success of the 
company from the viewpoint of a third party. If the buyer comes from a differ-
ent line of business, it will be harder for him to get an idea about the potential 
future development of the company compared to someone who is familiar 
with the existing markets and technologies of this particular branch of industry 
(Coff, 1999). If the buyer and seller come from different nations, it is clear that 
the buyer has a knowledge deficit regarding the culture, habits, institutional 
circumstances, and market conditions of the target nation (Mantecon, 2009, 
p. 640). Apart from this, the regulations for disclosing information may differ 
from state to state such that the information asymmetry may be increased even 
further. If the former management of the company is on the buyer-side, the 
mentioned information asymmetries may only partially exist, since the execu-
tives are at least as well-informed as the former owners about the chances and 
risks of the transaction.
The question now is how the existing differences in price expectations of 
the transaction parties can be overcome such that an initial non-existent area 
of agreement encountered during the negotiations can be reversed into a con-
sensus. For this purpose, many ways basically exist. For instance, the seller 
can give guarantees to pay corresponding compensations to the buyer if the 
expected targets of the company will not be reached. Besides this, earn-outs 
can be used to make the purchase price dependent on the future performance 
of the company (Toll and Rolinck, 2014). After a short characterization, we will 
discuss the suitability of earn-outs from the viewpoint of the buyer as well as 
the seller in the present contribution. Thereby, not only are the disadvantages 
addressed, but also the advantages. The contribution ends in Section 4 with 
a summary of our findings.
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2. Characterizing earn-outs
2.1. The basic idea
Earn-outs are useful in separating the purchase price into an upfront fixed 
payment that is due at the transfer date (base price) and into a deferred variable 
part (earn-outs), whereby the variable components of the purchase price depend 
on the future economic development of the company or the realization of cer-
tain conditions that are laid out in a contract (Kohers and Ang, 2000, p. 445; Del 
Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 88; Craig and Smith, 2003, p. 45; Reuer et al., 2004, 
p. 20; Frankel, 2005, p. 22; Caselli et al., 2006, p. 98; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009, 
p. 858; Cain et al., 2011, p. 152).
For the enforcement of a company transaction by utilizing earn-outs we can 
distinguish between an improvement-option model and a multistage company 
purchase (Weiser, 2004, p. 513; Knauer and Pex, 2011, pp. 401–402). Whereas 
the buyer acquires only a certain part of the company in a multistage company 
purchase and is granted the right from the seller to buy further parts of the com-
pany at fixed exercise prices, the company is, by utilizing an improvement-option 
model, transferred completely to the buyer at the transfer date. In contrast, by 
means of an improvement-option, the fixed part of the purchase price (which 
becomes due at the closing of the transaction) is supplemented by additional 
payments that depend on the future performance of the company and may in-
crease or even reduce the upfront fixed payment. Both variants normally increase 
the likelihood of a positive negotiation outcome. The granting of a call option 
enables the buyer to transfer a part of the economic risk to the seller so that the 
buyer is often willing to accept a higher purchase price for this opportunity. The 
seller receives the improvement-option for making concessions to the base price.
2.2. Elements
As a foundation for the computation of the additional payments, we must 
define a certain metric (Frankel, 2005, p. 22–23; Cain et al., 2011, pp. 155–156). 
Mostly, it is an observable performance measurement of accounting that can be 
precisely quantified and is inter-subjectively verifiable. For this purpose, sales, an-
nual net profits, operating income, EBITDA, EBIT, or cash flow can be taken into 
consideration, to name just a few (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 90; Gundersen, 
2005, p. 2; Caselli et al., 2006, p. 99). It is also possible to define non-financial 
metrics; e.g., the grant of a certain patent or the continued success of a valu-
able costumer relationship (Ziegler, 2016, p. 227). It is of great importance to 
choose a performance measurement that is complementary to the targets of the 
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buyer (e.g., concerning the maximization of profits, market share, technological 
leadership, etc.).
As the basis for assessment, we denote that part of the metric that is the 
numerical basis for the determination of the absolute level of the additional pay-
ments during the earn-out period (Weiser, 2004, p. 513). This may be the com-
plete metric or only part of it. The absolute amount of the additional payments 
depends on the participation of the seller in reaching the basis for assessment 
whereby this participation will be contracted in a fixed or variable manner. It is 
conceivable that a certain earn-out payment will become due at the crossing of 
a pre-defined threshold or will change proportionally with the level of the assess-
ment basis (Frankel, 2005, p. 24; Gundersen, 2005, p. 2).
The earn-out period is not defined consistently in the literature, but it typi-
cally has a time span from two up to five years (Datar et al., 2001, p. 202; Del 
Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 88; Reuer et al., 2004, p. 20; Caselli et al., 2006, p. 99; 
Cain et al., 2011, pp. 156–157). Possible payment dates are within or at the end 
of the earn-out period, whereby the payments can be made in fixed or variable 
amounts as well as in cash or the form of company shares.
2.3. Functions
A central problem of company transactions is the information asymmetry 
between the negotiation parties (Datar et al., 2001), which can be overcome or at 
least mitigated by the signaling function of earn-outs (Datar et al., 2001, p. 231; 
Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 88; Reuer et al., 2004, p. 20; Caselli et al., 2006, 
pp. 98–99; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009, p. 876). If the negotiation situation comes 
to a stalemate and the marginal price of the seller is above that of the buyer, there 
is no area of agreement between the negotiation parties. The earn-out method al-
lows the buyer to transfer a part of the business risk of not realizing the expected 
future performance of the company to the seller (Kohers and Ang, 2000, p. 445; 
Reuer et al., 2004, p. 20) and increases his willingness to pay a higher purchase 
price in return (Frankel, 2005, p. 22). On the other hand, the seller is willing to 
reduce the fixed purchase price claim if he is confident that the remaining part of 
the “desired price” can be realized by means of earn-outs. Thus, the limits of their 
respective willingness to concede, as far as the purchase price is concerned, can 
approach each other and can open a window of opportunity for a positive area of 
agreement (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 88; Ziegler, 2016, p. 226).
From the viewpoint of the buyer, the company transaction is an investment. 
Financial means must be raised, which may come from various sources. Besides 
the classical instruments of debt and equity financing, earn-outs can make a con-
tribution to funding (Craig and Smith, 2003, p. 46; Gundersen, 2005, p. 2). 
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It is characteristic for earn-outs that the purchase price is not paid in a one-off 
payment but is spread over the earn-out period in the form of one or more pay-
ments depending on the ex-post company success. This form of purchase-price 
distribution is similar to a loan that is granted from the seller to the buyer and is 
paid back by means of earn-out payments.
An earn-out agreement has an incentive and motivation function for the 
seller to remain active and to provide his specific skills and knowledge within the 
target’s management. In this manner, he is able to keep control over the deter-
mining metrics to realize the desired price in a proactive way (Datar et al., 2001, 
p. 202; Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 88; Kohers and Ang, 2000, pp. 447–448; 
Caselli et al., 2006, pp. 98–99; Cain et al., 2011, p. 152).
3. Assessment of earn-outs from vantage points  
of negotiation parties
3.1. Suitability of earn-outs from buyer’s viewpoint
Because of the deferral of the purchase price, the seller is still faced to the risk 
of not realizing the expected future success of the company such that an agreement 
on earn-outs is especially interesting for the buyer if the future development of 
the target cannot be predicted or can be predicted only under severe difficulties 
(Toll and Rolinck, 2014, pp. 156–158). The risk to overpay is reduced in case 
the company will not live up to its expectations in the foreseeable future (Kohers 
and Ang, 2000, pp. 446–447; Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 89; Caselli et al., 2006, 
p. 98; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009, p. 859). Apart from this, the buyer spares valu-
able cash. The buyer has fewer problems raising the appropriate financing for the 
acquisition of the company since the payments become due no earlier than when 
the company is on the road to success. For fixing the additional payments, the 
transaction parties must exercise caution to prevent them from having a “strangling” 
effect. This could take away incentives from the buyer to undertake his part of the 
necessary commitments for reaching the economic success during the earn-out 
period. This can be alleviated by capping the additional payments (Caselli et al., 
2006, p. 99; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009, p. 860) or by the decreasingly structured 
participation of the seller. Moreover, the earn-out period should not be too long 
since the buyer may have more problems to integrate the target into his current 
corporate structure the more that time passes (Ziegler, 2016, p. 228).
The transfer of the financing function to the seller means that the buyer 
spares liquid capital and needs to raise less debt and has fewer obligations to pay 
for interest and amortization (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 89). The variable parts 
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of the purchase price can be financed partially through retained earnings. However, 
the seller needs to be assured that the buyer actually honors his pledge to make 
the promised additional payments, which may become due dependent on metrics 
that only indirectly relate to liquidity (like the grant of a certain patent or the de-
velopment of a new product). To face these problems, it lends itself to draft the 
possible earn-out payments at the closing date to a deposit on a fiduciary account 
or to secure the payments by backing them with assets or by a bank guarantee 
(Hilgard, 2010, p. 2916; Ziegler, 2016, p. 231). However, the capital commitment 
by using a fiduciary account undermines the intended financing function.
Company transactions are often characterized by the fact that the information 
about the company is distributed unevenly between the negotiation parties. The 
main cause is that the seller has inside information about the company, whereas 
the buyer only can obtain beneficial knowledge by analyzing past annual financial 
statements. With respect to an information economic context, pre-contractual 
asymmetric information entails the danger of adverse selection. Akerlof illus-
trated the concept of adverse selection with the aid of used-car markets (Akerlof, 
1970). If the situation of a used-car buyer is one-to-one transferred to the buyer 
of a company, we can indeed observe parallels. Adverse selection occurs because 
of an information gap between the buyer and the seller, which exists ex-ante. 
Only the seller is really informed about the true quality of the company and has 
the incentive to present his company most favorably. Thus, the buyer must carry 
a quality risk and is inclined to assume only an average quality of the valuation 
object. He is therefore only willing to pay an average purchase price. However, the 
seller of a company of above-average quality may not be willing to accept a below-
average price. A transaction to an average price is only attractive for those sellers 
who offer companies with below-average quality. Hence, only companies with 
below-average quality are offered for sale at this price. To let a seller of a company 
with good quality realize his desired transaction price, the potential buyer must 
be persuaded to increase his willingness to pay by signaling this higher quality to 
the buyer-side. Such a signal could be the implementation of earn-outs into the 
purchase contract (Caselli et al., 2006, pp. 98–99). The seller signals his pledge 
to carry a part of the entrepreneurial risk beyond the closing date of the transac-
tion. This is an important signal to the buyer that the risks to actually overpay 
are diminished (Reuer et al., 2004, p. 20; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009, p. 859). In 
return, he may be willing to accept a higher purchase price. Thus, we can state 
that the concession of the seller to arrange a performance-related price facilitates 
the burden to the buyer to distinguish between valuable and less-valuable com-
panies and reduces the risk for him to overpay for the company.
If the seller will carry on management of the company, the agreement on earn-
outs gives him an incentive to make greater efforts towards the company’s 
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success (Baums, 1993, pp. 1275–1276; Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 89; Weiser, 
2004, p. 516; Knauer and Pex, 2011, pp. 403). Moreover, this has the additional 
advantage for the buyer that valuable knowledge is retained within the company 
(Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 89). Especially, if we consider owner-managed 
companies, the seller will have enlarged knowledge with regard to customers, 
markets, and their corresponding technologies.
If the seller is managing the business, the buyer could be confronted with 
the problem of moral hazard. Here, we have a bilateral cooperation in which 
a principal (buyer) delegates a better-informed agent (seller) to carry out a certain 
task (managing the business) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Here, we have a special 
situation since the interests of both agents oppose each other and at least one 
party has superior information, which he could opportunistically exploit. Even if 
both information levels are (nearly) identical at the transfer date, that of the man-
aging party will increase over time (Behringer, 2004, p. 247). Since the level of 
earn-outs is a matter of conflict between both parties, the seller has an incentive to 
exploit this information advantage and influence the basis of assessment defining 
the earn-outs for his own benefit and to the detriment of the principal (Frankel, 
2005, p. 24; Baums, 1993, p. 1276; Behringer, 2004, pp. 247–248). If the annual 
net profit is used as a basis for assessment, the temptation for the seller is high to 
postpone necessary expenditures like those needed for maintenance or research 
and development (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 90). If sales are the basis for 
assessing the additional payments, it is possible for the seller to increase sales in 
the short term by offering price discounts or by increasing advertising, which may 
deteriorate the future prospects of the company in the long term. Also, leeway in 
accounting rules like options to capitalize or valuation options can be exploited in 
the seller’s favor (Gundersen, 2005, pp. 2–3). Not least, it is required to agree on 
associated post-closing non-competition clauses (Gundersen, 2005, p. 2) to enjoin 
the managing seller from poaching employees and/or customers as well as passing 
internal information to competitors for his own benefit (Baums, 1993, p. 1276).
There are manifold possibilities to manipulate for the seller that must be 
prevented by appropriate measures. Thus, the buyer should covenant that he is 
able to exercise extensive rights of participation and control (Baums, 1993, p. 1276; 
Behringer, 2004, p. 247). The integration of a catalog of transactions into the 
purchase contract that are subject to approval would also counteract manipula-
tions. To prevent the omission of necessary operating expenditures, a budget for 
research and development or certain principles for carrying out investments and 
depreciations could be set out in the contract (Frankel, 2005, p. 24). Apart from 
this, it would lend itself to integrate the acquired company into the investment 
controlling of the acquiring company. The best protection against manipulations 
would be to define the basis for assessment for the earn-outs that is least-prone 
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to error and can be precisely defined. Thereby, it could be specified how any 
exceptional circumstances should be handled. To prevent litigation, it is useful 
to exemplify the computation of the basis for assessment within the appendix of 
the purchase contract (Hilgard, 2010, p. 2914; Ziegler, 2016, p. 228).
Should the seller resign from the company after the sale, his influence on 
the success of the company and the outcome of the decisive quantities (which 
determine the additional payments) is diminished. He has to reckon that the buyer 
will act opportunistically and will try to prevent further earn-outs. Of course, the 
seller wants to counteract such behaviors by means of an appropriate drafting of 
the contract. For this purpose, concrete arrangements for the form of manage-
ment, determination of the governing metrics (which define the additional pay-
ments), and participation and control rights have to be made (Gundersen, 2005, 
p. 3; Baums, 1993, p. 1276). These arrangements can strongly restrict the buyer 
in his entrepreneurial freedom since he may not be able to realize important 
projects, like the integration of the acquired company (Datar et al., 2001, p. 203; 
Frankel, 2005, p. 24). Furthermore, he loses a certain degree of flexibility since 
he must first assess the conformity of upcoming decisions with contractual agree-
ments and has to coordinate them with the seller. If the buyer is concurrently 
managing the company, he has to take care that the contractual agreements will 
not restrict his entrepreneurial freedom to act too much; in particular, as far as 
the realization of possible synergy effects is concerned (Behringer, 2004, p. 250; 
Weiser, 2004, p. 517). Otherwise, a corporate transaction combined with earn-
outs is unattractive from the buyer’s viewpoint.
A contract that takes into account all possible contingencies that may occur in 
the wake of a transaction needs to be considerably complex (Ragozzino and Reuer, 
2009, p. 860). The resulting high transaction costs reduce the advantageousness of 
an agreement on earn-outs (Datar et al., 2001, p. 203; Reuer et al., 2004, pp. 19–20; 
Frankel, 2005, pp. 22–25) since it is almost impossible to consider all contingen-
cies, and it is foreseeable that arguments concerning the proper interpretation of 
the agreements could arise ex-post. The related potential costs are initiation and 
contractual costs as well as the costs for safeguards (e.g., for the adaptation of the 
contract to changed conditions) and enforcement (e.g., for legal fees).
3.2. Suitability of earn-outs from the seller’s viewpoint
Utilizing earn-outs is especially useful from the perspective of the seller 
if he does not succeed in realizing his price expectations in the first place or 
has difficulties in finding a buyer for his company (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, 
p. 89; Behringer, 2004, p. 247; Hilgard, 2010, p. 2913; Toll and Rolinck, 2014, 
pp. 158–159). Primarily, an agreement on earn-outs provides an opportunity to 
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proceed with a corporate transaction that would not be realizable without the 
implementation of such an instrument (Cain et al., 2011, p. 152). By declaring 
his motivation to accept a performance-related price and to assume some part of 
the risks, he widens the spectrum of potential buyers.
By means of a preparedness to agree on earn-outs, the seller sends an impor-
tant signal to potential buyers. However, the seller will only do this if he is truly 
convinced of the future potential for success of his company (Caselli et al., 2006, 
pp. 98–99). A buyer will tend to estimate the quality of such a company higher and 
will be willing to accept a higher purchase price than without such a signal. It can 
be taken for granted that an agreement on earn-outs has an impact on achieving 
a higher selling price (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 89). In addition, it is pos-
sible for a managing seller to influence the level of the purchase price further on 
proactively by accepting performance-related earn-outs (Datar et al., 2001, p. 203).
On the other hand, by agreeing to a partially performance-based selling price, 
the seller takes the risk that he will fail to receive his desired selling price 
and must be even prepared to suffer a potential total loss of additional payments 
(Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 90). It is conceivable that the buyer is incapable 
of making the contractually arranged additional payments to the seller if he is in 
a situation of insolvency or short of liquidity. Hence, the seller bears the credit 
risk of the buyer, which of course can be alleviated by agreements on collateral.
Especially in the cases in which the seller carries on managing the business, 
he has increased pressure to succeed and cannot terminate his engagement in 
the company (which may have been the initial (main) motive for the corporate 
sale) (Baums, 1993, p. 1275). This also holds true if he is not actively involved in 
management anymore but must execute certain contractually arranged partici-
pation and control rights. Furthermore, a seller who still manages the business 
may experience motivational problems (Meuli, 1996, p. 83). While forgoing the 
prompt appropriation of a fair and just selling price (in his view), he is instead 
responsible for achieving certain performance targets but is not allowed to reap 
the ripe and well-earned “fruits” and keep them all for himself.
From the seller’s viewpoint, contractual obligations can have a negative effect 
on the freedom to act (Baums, 1993, p. 1276). If he still runs the business, he 
has to manage the company as stipulated in the contract. If he resigns from the 
company, there could be a post-contractual competition restraint to keep him 
from exploiting inside information for his own advantage.
If the seller leaves the company at the transfer date, he is in danger of suffer-
ing disadvantages by the opportunistic behavior of the buyer. The buyer will 
try to use his full creativity to keep the earn-outs as minimal as possible (Frankel, 
2005, p. 24). Apart from the exploitation of leeway in accounting rules, concealing 
the basis for assessment (Behringer, 2004, pp. 246–248) or shifting the earnings 
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to years that are beyond the earn-out period (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 90; 
Frankel, 2005, p. 24; Ziegler, 2016, p. 228), the seller faces further risks. Maybe 
he must defend himself against efforts by the buyer to sell the company to a third 
party or transfer its headquarters abroad (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 91). As 
a result, it could happen that the accounting rules change and the performance 
measures determined from the annual financial statements become incomparable 
as a result (Craig and Smith, 2003, p. 47). If the buyer is already in possession 
of one or more companies, he will try to integrate the purchased company into 
his current corporate structure. This can go even so far that the business opera-
tions of the target company are completely or partially transferred to another 
company or certain operating units are united under the roof of a corporate 
group (Gundersen, 2005, p. 2; Caselli et al., 2006, p. 99). In this case, the seller 
is exposed to the risk of a distorted success indicator concerning the acquisition 
object if arbitrary transfer prices are used in accounting during the earn-out period 
(Datar et al., 2001, p. 203). Thus, the computation of the basis for assessment of 
the earn-outs would be made more difficult at best. In the extreme case, the basis 
for assessment would no longer reflect the actual economic success of the target.
The seller must be especially careful to not be discriminated against if the 
buyer manages the company within the earn-out period. The seller could be in 
danger of being exposed to manipulations that affect the additional payments 
and unable to do anything against them (Baums, 1993, p. 1274; Behringer, 2004, 
pp. 246–248; Weiser, 2004, p. 517; Hilgard, 2010, p. 2913). Because of this reason, 
the earn-out period should be not too short. This would rather increase the incen-
tives for the buyer to shift earnings from the earn-out period to subsequent years. 
On the other hand, the opportunities for the seller to influence and control are 
fewer the longer the earn-out period is. Hence, supplementary to an agreement 
on earn-outs, the seller will often demand the additional (minimal) assurance 
that he is contractually guaranteed the opportunity to exert influence (e.g., in the 
position of a managing director or as a member of supervisory or advisory boards) 
during the earn-out period (Gundersen, 2005, p. 3; Behringer, 2004, p. 248).
4. Summary and outlook
Earn-outs are an interesting approach to overcoming divergent price expec-
tations. However, there is a substantial potential for conflict in the formulation 
and implementation of a concrete agreement on earn-outs (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 
2001, p. 89). Thus, the disparate interests of the conflicting parties (especially 
with regard to the price) and their different information levels require a relatively 
complex contract arrangement, which is associated with high transaction costs. 
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Of course, existing information asymmetries could be mitigated in the beginning 
by considering valuation reports and/or exercising due diligence in investigating 
the company. However, these asymmetries cannot be completely removed even 
by these means. The use of earn-outs out of the pure wish of creating seemingly 
better financing for the transaction seems to be inappropriate (Meuli, 1996, 
p. 90). For this purpose, there are a number of less-complex contractual means 
available, like re-investments, vendor loans, or company purchase on an annuity 
basis. Because of the significant potential for conflict, it is recommended to set 
out certain procedures in the purchase contract (which could come into effect 
during mediation in the case of lawsuits). For this purpose, it is possible to appoint 
certain arbiters or arbitration courts (other than an auditor) in advance (Baums, 
1993, p. 1275; Hilgard, 2010, p. 2917). To avoid such confrontations from the 
start, we must pay special attention to the careful and precise formulation of 
the earn-out agreement. In particular, we must take great care in writing a clear 
definition of the process that determines the profit sharing as well as a diligent 
provision of the rights and duties of the transaction parties (Weiser, 2004, p. 518). 
If the above-mentioned aspects are considered for the arrangement of a company 
transaction, the earn-out method can be truly beneficial for both negotiation 
parties and can contribute to the final success of otherwise-impossible-seeming 
transactions (Del Roccili and Fuhr, 2001, p. 93).
The corresponding literature on earn-outs consists in large part of publications 
that analyze this topic by the means of empirical post-studies, which address the 
Anglo-Saxon area in particular (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Datar et al., 2001; Reuer 
et al., 2004; Cain et al., 2011). However, the situation in the European Economic 
Area (and especially in Germany) has been studied only marginally (Ewelt-Knauer 
et al., 2011; Heimann et al., 2012). Unfortunately, data from ex-post studies can 
only give minor information for managerial decisions with a future perspective. 
Hence, there is a substantial demand for further research on ex-ante consider-
ations for the determination of company transactions involving earn-outs. In the 
main part of the literature dealing with valuation problems, finance-theoretical 
valuation approaches are used (Crasselt and Lukas, 2008; Tallau, 2009a; Tallau, 
2009b; Tallau, 2010; Ihlau and Gödecke, 2010). However, valuation methods 
based on financing theory assume a fictitious perfect market (Markowitz, 1952; 
Gordon, 1959; Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 
1966; Black and Scholes 1973; Cox et al., 1979; Rappaport, 1981; Koller et al., 
2010, Damodaran, 2011). These methods do not take into account the individual 
expectations of the specific valuation subject. Instead, they pursue a futile quest 
for the one true value that must be generally valid. Such methods are inappropri-
ate to indicate the limit of the concession willingness of a decision maker under 
realistic conditions (Hering et al., 2014a, p. 49; Hering et al., 2014b, p. 41; Her-
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ing et al., 2015a). For this purpose, investment-theoretical methods are more 
appropriate. Hence, for company transactions involving earn-outs, there seems 
to be a need to develop investment theory-based valuation methods that consider 
both existing market imperfections (e.g., debt limits or bid-ask spreads) and the 
individual expectations of a specific decision maker.
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